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Abstract
BinType: A Scalable Type Inference Tool for Compiled C Programs
Briti Sundar Mondal
Reverse-engineering program binaries often relies on the recovery of high-level data
abstractions. In particular, recovering variables and their type is challenging as most
such information is lost during compilation. Although past proposals seem to have
addressed this problem, their approaches are either not scalable and suffer from cov-
erage issues (e.g., dynamic analysis), or yield insufficient precision by staying too
conservative (e.g., static analysis). Furthermore, most recent works lift assembly to
Intermediate Representation (IR), which standardizes low-level operations, and may
lose some useful semantics for type inference. In this thesis, we propose BinType, a
static analysis-based, scalable, precise and conservative tool that works directly on
x86 assembly to automatically reveal type information of variables and function ar-
guments. BinType is 45% more precise than TIE (NDSS’11) on a dataset 3.5 times
larger, and orders of magnitude faster than its underlying algorithm. We also show
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Compilation of high-level languages to binary inherently obscures data abstractions
such as function arguments, local variables and their types, as their use is converted
to a limited set of operations in registers and segmented memory regions. Recovering
such lost abstractions is a prerequisite for several reverse-engineering applications,
including binary program analysis [16], binary rewriting [25, 57], binary to source
matching [47, 46, 39], function prototype identification [18], open-source software
license violations [29] and function clone detection [36, 27].
The first step in reverse engineering data abstractions is often to identify function
boundaries, then identify local variables, function arguments and returns. Identifica-
tion alone has been the subject of various work, cf. [10, 11, 18, 25, 41], often relying
on algorithms similar to the value-set analysis (VSA [9]). The next step is to infer
the type of the identified variables, generally performed through the use of dynamic
and static analysis techniques.
Dynamic analysis-based solutions utilize emulation or instrumentation tools such
as: a) QEMU [13], an emulator used in Laika [21]; b) PIN [44], which controls the
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execution of a process through the Linux ptrace API, used in REWARDS [42] and
TIE [41]; or c) KLEE [19], generating inputs through symbolic execution to cover
a high number of possible execution paths, used in Howard [53]. These solutions
execute a program, possibly several times on various inputs, and collect and analyze
runtime traces. While this process reveals actual behaviors and memory values, it
is essentially resource-intensive and slow; cf. Howard [53]: “[i]t takes several hours
to obtain reasonable coverage of real-life applications”. To avoid long running times,
only one execution trace can be analyzed at the expense of limited code coverage,
e.g., REWARDS only covers about 30% of all functions and heap-allocated variables
in the ten binaries analyzed in a single run.
Static analysis-based solutions (e.g., Hex-Rays [31], TIE [41], and [25]) analyze
the whole program binary, since they are not limited to a given execution path, and
they usually perform significantly faster than dynamic analysis approaches. However,
they require additional effort to identify variables and understand memory-related
behaviors that are not directly observable.
Both types of analysis share several key ideas, including type sinks, type-revealing
instructions, and refining type precision as the analysis proceeds. TIE follows a com-
bination of static and dynamic approaches to infer types, and claims better accuracy
than REWARDS (for the dynamic analysis part) and Hex-Rays (for the static analy-
sis part). TIE’s authors also define the concept of conservativeness, i.e., the algorithm
should prefer to output a general type (e.g., reg32 ) than a possibly incorrect precise
type (e.g., unsigned int). They show that Hex-Rays [31], an industrial state-of-the-art
reverse engineering tool that uses proprietary heuristics to infer types, often outputs
incorrect precise types such as int instead of pointer types [41].
Most approaches also leverage Intermediate Representation (IR) such as BIL
2
(e.g., [41]) or LLVM IR (e.g., [25]) to standardize low-level operations, and per-
form their analysis on such a sanitized form. While working on IR may enable
platform-independence, this may sometimes mandate the use of platform-specific
details back into IR—e.g., understand the meaning of specific registers (e.g., ebp,
esp) and their relationship with function arguments that are dependent on calling
conventions (e.g., [41]).
Although several academic solutions have been proposed in the last decade for type
recovery, and claimed better results than the leading commercial solution Hex-Rays,
none provide convincing evidence to satisfy both accuracy and scalability. ElWazeer
et al. [25] bring scalability to type inference with similar results in terms of accuracy
as TIE (considered the state-of-the-art in this thesis), but much faster than TIE;
however, their focus is on binary rewriting, which does not always require precise
type recognition. Furthermore, leading proposals such as REWARDS and TIE are
still unavailable to the public or the research community, several years after their
publication;1 whereas the algorithm used in ElWazeer et al. is protected by US
Patent [12]. Moreover, the comparison between existing proposals is fragile at times,
as only bar charts and a few selected numbers are documented. We highlight the
need for making such tools publicly available, and publishing more precise results for
an easy comparison.2
We propose a static analysis-based reverse engineering approach called BinType,
which directly analyzes x86 instructions to automatically reveal type information of
variables and function arguments from stripped binaries. We will make open-source
1We emailed authors of some of these tools; we either got no response, or the authors simply
stated that their tool has not been maintained.
2For example, TIE shows the average distance between inferred and actual types for individual
binary in Coreutils in a graph, but does not provide real numbers (except for 5 out of 87 binaries)
and the overall score across all binaries; we extrapolate the overall score to be around 1.6 from Fig.
12 in the TIE paper [41] (the average appears to be around 1.42 in TIE’s presentation slides [40,
slide 49 (left)]). However, ElWazeer et al. [25] report this overall average distance to be 2 for TIE
(lower is better).
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our BinType implementation, and our evaluation shows that BinType is both scalable
and precise, while remaining conservative as in TIE. To the best of our knowledge,
only Hex-Rays works directly on disassembled instructions as we do, while others
either work on runtime traces or IR. However, Hex-Rays is a closed source tool, with-
out much documentation of its design. Moreover, in Section 5.2, we show that type
inference and function arguments recovery of Hex-Rays is quite inaccurate. While
several proposals also consider complex data structures (e.g., [9, 11]), we focus on the
recovery of precise primitive C types, while segregating complex types, i.e., we detect
when a type is complex but do not infer its precise type. Detecting accurate type for
complex data structures is largely an open problem, and most current proposals are
still rudimentary, see e.g., [53, 42].
We leverage IDA Pro to disassemble the target binary program, which additionally
provides the function boundaries, and information on variables for each identified
function. Then, our arguments recovery module extracts function arguments for each
function. Finally, the assembly instructions along with variables and arguments are
used for type inference. The type inference module performs static analysis to infer
data types from the given context and instruction semantics (e.g., standard library
function calls, and type revealing instructions), as considered in past work [42, 41].
We improve related techniques to infer types from x86 instructions, and also introduce
format string analysis to improve our precision (not considered earlier). Inferred types
are propagated backward and forward for typing dependent variables. At the end of
the analysis, we perform an inter-procedural analysis to refine types by treating all
identified function prototypes as a sink point.
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1.2 Thesis statement
In this work, our main goal is to type inference from x86 assembly instructions. To
achieve this objective we explore following research questions:
Question 1. Is it possible to infer variable types directly from x86 dissembled
instructions in a scaleable and precise manner?
Question 2. Can we apply our extracted information to any real world reverse
engineering application?
1.3 Contributions
Our main contributions are as follows:
1. We present BinType, a static analysis tool to recover the type of variables
(e.g., function arguments, return, local variables) directly from disassembled
x86 binaries. BinType is fast and scales well; it can process about 25,000
assembly instructions/second in a regular desktop machine. It also outperforms
existing solutions in terms of preciseness and conservativeness.
2. We build on existing techniques from past work, and introduce new mechanisms,
such as the use of x86 calling conventions, uninitialized registers, and format
string analysis. Our result indicates that the new techniques play a significant
role in identifying precise types.
3. We evaluate BinType using the most comprehensive dataset so far (3.5x larger
than TIE). We use 148 binary files (704,658 assembly instructions) from six
open source projects, in contrast to TIE’s evaluation on Coreutils (87 binaries,
totaling 203,997 instructions). Our average distance (0.87) from the source type
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is better than TIE (1.6); note that, distance zero is ideal. Our inferred types
are also conservative more than 91% of the time.
4. We demonstrate applicability of BinType for binary to source matching, where
our extracted features (e.g., function prototypes, string literals) make a signifi-
cant impact on the accuracy of an existing proposal [50].
1.4 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the background and related
work on type inference. Chapter 3 gives an overview of BinType. Section 4 details our
design including improvements on existing techniques. After providing the experiment
setup and accuracy of our obtained results in Chapter 5, we investigate a real-world
application of BinType in Chapter 6 and finally, conclude our work in Chapter 7.
6
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss the relevant background and literature related to our
dissertation.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 High-level source code
High-level programming languages (e.g., C, C++, Java, Python) are used to imple-
ment computer applications, which are later transformed to software artifacts un-
derstood by a computer. All high-level source code contain human understandable
syntax and semantic that allow to implement a logic in a much easier and less error
prone way than low-level languages (e.g., assembly). Moreover, these high-level lan-
guages follow closer syntax between each other that allows a programmer to easily
switch from one language to another. Here, we discuss some high-level features (e.g.,
variables (function arguments and local variables), variable types, standard library
functions and formate strings) of C language, which are related to our work, using a
sample example in Listing 2.1.
7
The sample function read_string_from_file receives a file name. Inside the func-
tion body, it reads a fix length of string from the file and displays it to a standard






5 int read_string_from_file (char* file)
6 {
7 char str [1000];
8 FILE *filePtr;
9
10 if (( filePtr=fopen(file ,"r")) == NULL){











22 int main (int argc , char* argv [])
23 {
24 int status = read_string_from_file("file.txt");
25 return 0;
26 }
Listing 2.1: An example of high level source code C
8
The function contains two local variables str, filePtr and one argument file; str
and file are char*, and filePtr is a FILE*. It invokes four other functions: fopen,
printf, fscanf and flcose, that are not defined in the program context. In C, these
functions are known as standard library functions, which follow fixed specifications
and their interface is defined in C header files (e.g., stdio.h, stdlib.h). For instance,
the function fopen is used to read a file content. It receives a file name and access
mode (e.g., r indicates only a file read) as arguments, and returns a file pointer. The
function fclose takes the return file pointer by fopen as an argument and closes the
file. Functions fscanf and printf are used to read data from the file and show it on
the display. Both functions take a format string as arguments; format specifiers in
a format string represent the arrangement of data read and write. Here, the format
specifier %s indicates that a string value is read and displayed.
2.1.2 Source code compilation steps
The high-level programming language is converted to machine understandable pro-
gram through the compilation, which allows a program to run on a machine. This
process varies from language to language. For instance, compilation of Java source
code is entirely different from the compilation of a C source code. C is run as a stan-
dalone program in x86 machine, where Java is operated on a virtual machine called
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [43]. Here, we discuss the compilation steps of C that
is one of the most common programming languages [55]. The steps of C source code
compilation are illustrated in Figure 1.
Compiler. A compiler transfers C source code to assembly. During the compilation,
compiler removes all the high-level information (i.e., function prototypes, variables,
data structures) and translates to assembly instructions. Our goal is to facilitate











Figure 1: Steps in a compilation process
the details of a compiler’s intermediate steps. We use an example source code (see
Listing 2.2) taken from [40] to demonstrate the steps.
The source code contains a function foo that has two arguments (char* buf and
unsigned int* out), a local variable unsigned int c, and it returns a unsigned int value.
During the compilation, the compiler first checks the type information of received
arguments, local variables and return; replaces the type information according to its
data length; and they are put into the stack slots. Listing 2.3 and Listing 2.4 represent
the code after replacing the type information and afterwards positions in stack slots
respectively.






Figure 2: A typical compilation process
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1 unsigned int foo(char *buf , unsigned int *out)
2 {
3 unsigned int c;
4 c = 0;
5
6 if (buf) {
7 *out = strlen(buf);





Listing 2.2: Example source code
1 [32-bit] foo([32-bit] buf , [32-bit] out)
2 {
3 [32-bit] c;
4 c = 0;
5
6 if (buf) {
7 *out = strlen(buf);



















Figure 3: Function stack
Figure 3 shows the orientation of a function stack frame to demonstrate how ar-
guments and variables are organized inside the stack. Arguments are always inserted
into the top stack during the function call, where all local variables are placed into
lower stack addresses. For instance, arguments buf and out are put into the top stack
positioning in [+8] and [+12], where local variable c is put in lower stack [ 12] in
Listing 2.4. Finally, the entire code is transformed to assembly instructions where
variables locations (arguments, local variables and return) are used through the direct
or indirect memory accesses. At Line 4 in Listing 2.5, a value zero is assigned into
the stack slot [ 12] that actually holds the variable c. If we look at Line 4 of the







5 [32-bit] [ -12];
6 [-12] = 0;
7 if ([+8]) {
8 *[+12] = strlen ([+8]);
9 [-12] = *[+12] - 1;
10 }
11 return [ -12];
12 }
Listing 2.4: Assigning variables into memory
1 push %ebp
2 mov %esp ,%ebp
3 sub 0x28 ,%esp
4 movl 0x0 ,-0xc(%ebp)
5 cmpl 0x0 ,0x8(%ebp)
6 je 804844d <foo+0x2e >
7 mov 0x8(%ebp) ,%eax
8 mov %eax ,(%esp)
9 call 804831c <strlenplt >
10 mov 0xc(%ebp) ,%edx
11 mov %eax ,(%edx)
12 mov 0xc(%ebp) ,%eax
13 mov (%eax) ,%eax
14 sub 0x1 ,%eax
15 mov %eax ,-0xc(%ebp)
16 mov -0xc(%ebp) ,%eax
17 leave
18 ret
Listing 2.5: Translated assembly code
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Assembler and linker. An assembler translates the obtained assembly instructions
into an object file. Finally, the linker creates an executable by linking the object files
and required modules to run the object files.
2.1.3 Applications of type inference
In this section, we describe the usefulness of different applications that need or directly
benefit from type inference.
1. Binary to source matching – Source code of software always allows a pro-
gram analyst to understand the logic in a much easier way. In most source
code of commercial software and malware is not available. Understanding
the functionalities of such software needs low-level instruction analysis. Low-
level programs contain less program semantics and require additional steps
(e.g., extraction of control flow graphs, call graphs) to get program structures.
While, identification of reused functions inside program binaries provide more
details information about the software and speed up the reverse engineering
process([47], [39]).
2. Reverse engineering – The goal of reverse engineering is to understand the
binary for further analysis. The analyst may not have access the source code or
debug symbols of the binary. Type inference allows to infer high-level semantics
of a program’s functionality by recovering the missing debug symbol tables from
stripped binaries ([32], [28], [34]).
3. Decompilation – Decompilation retrieves a pseudo source code from as-
sembly that provides meaningful information to understand the program
([26], [49], [20], [15]). Identifying variable types is one the most challenging
tasks during decompilation [23].
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4. Binary code rewriting – Rewriting a binary program allows a programmer to
add new features, modify the binary functionality [38], enhance the security [8]
and port the program into another architecture [51], [52], [33]. Typing variables
accurately makes the programmer’s job easier by identifying absolute memory
addresses that may need to re-adjust during program rewrite.
5. Binary code reuse – Reusing binary code is useful when the source code is not
available for that binary. Extraction of a functional code block (e.g., function)
allows a programmer to add that functionality directly to many other applica-
tions. It also provides a unique benefit in malware analysis ([37], [56], [59]).
One of the main challenges here is to identify the code interface that involves
the recovery of function prototypes and return.
6. Vulnerability detection, analysis, and prevention – Another use case
of type inference is vulnerability analysis [53]. Type information provides the
location of variables and return addresses (e.g., pointer, buffer) and their size
that enables detecting buffer overflows. The modification of this vulnerable
location prevents buffer overflow exploitation.
7. Program clone detection – Type information can enable to identify a pro-
gram. This feature improves the accuracy of a binary clone detection that is
commonly used in the malware analysis ([27], [14], [24], [35]).
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss work from previous research that is related to type in-
ference. We divide the relevant approaches into four categories: (1) decompilation,
(2) variables recovery, (3) static and dynamic methods and (4) arguments recovery.
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We present TIE and REWADRS in more details in Section 2.3 to provide a better
understanding of type inference by static and dynamic analysis.
2.2.1 Decompilation
Researchers have previously suggested the idea of using type inference to support
decompilation [48], [45], [23]. However, the work done until now used to infer C types
directly, while we go for a type system that allows to choose exact or closest type for
each variable. This helps to avoid misleading about type information in the binaries.
Moreover, some high-level features including register arguments, floating point stack
variables and data types are not detected by them either. Boomerang [26], a well-
known open source decompiler, has several limitations: (1) one has to assign the
register arguments manually, (2) it does not detect any floating point stack operations
and (3) makes a type guess (i.e., int) for each variable.
Phoenix is considered as an academic state-of-the-art decompiler. It is developed
on top of BAP [16] and uses a modified version of TIE [41] to infer types. It improves
the structure type analysis of TIE, but the analysis time makes it impractical for
regular use [25].
VSA is to subdivide the memory regions into variable-like entities, based on how
memory is accessed. For every memory location and register, it derives an over-
estimation of the set of addresses on which the variables span, and represent them
with an upper and lower bound, and a stride,
2.2.2 Variable recovery
Balakrishnan et al. [9], [10], [11] propose a binary analysis technique called value-
set analysis (VSA) that could help detect syntactic structures of variables, such as
field offsets, sizes, and simple structures. VSA subdivides the memory regions into
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variable-like entities, based on how memory is accessed and later derives an over-
estimation of the set of addresses on which the variables span. The method they
use involves the binary level points-to analysis and abstract interpretation. This
method allows to identifying data structures and variables from binary, not their
type. Moreover, their solution is also not scalable and possibly impractical for real
world implementation. Comparatively, the technique we propose to identify complex
type is rather scalable and straightforward.
2.2.3 Dynamic analysis
A dynamic-analysis-based solution utilize emulation tools (e.g., PIN [44]) to execute
programs, observe execution, collect runtime traces, and finally perform trace analysis
to identify program variables and data structures.
REWARDS [42] proposed an idea to infer the type information from the well-
known functions (e.g., standard library call, system call). Whenever a standard li-
brary function call (e.g., strcat) is detected inside a program, REWARDS labels the
related memory locations according to the known arguments type. Moreover, it prop-
agates the information backward and forward to refine more variables. Slowinska et
al. [53] implement Howard on the top of REWARDS. They advanced REWARDS by
identifying data structures on both heap and stack and complicated structures (e.g.,
array, nested array). However, dynamic analysis requires emulating the whole pro-
gram, which is a resource-consuming and slow process. In addition, it suffers from the
well-known coverage issue (i.e., not all paths are explored), which makes the analysis
incapable of handling program control flows.
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2.2.4 Static analysis
A static analysis-based approaches initially employ some knowledge about well-known
function prototypes and instruction mnemonics. Then, its use a heuristics method
(e.g.,Hex-Rays [31], DIVINE [10]) to identify the variable information and apply the
employed knowledge base for type inference.
Hex-Rays [31] which is always considered as an industrial state-of-the-art tool in
reverse engineering, uses proprietary heuristics to infer the type. We found out that
it always guess a signed integer type for an identified variable and next try to refine
the result if possible. Assigning a predetermined type without justification produces
inaccurate result; the same observation is reported by TIE [41].
TIE follows a combination of static and dynamic (similar to REWARDS) approach
to infer the type information, which claims better accuracy by comparing their result
with REWARDS and Hex-Rays. In static analysis, TIE leverages BAP to collect
the BIL instructions from binary and performs VSA to recover variable information
(i.e., structures, pointers, arrays). The recovered intermediate language is suitable
for platform independent solution and human understanding but does not capture
the complete functionality of the input executable. High-level features such as the
abstract stack, and symbols are always missing in their intermediate representations.
Moreover, Slowinska et al. [53] state that VSA based approaches are less accurate
to recover data structures. It cannot handle some common programming cases (e.g.,
memcpy, alloca), which provides a wrong estimation of variables stride length. El-
Wazeer et al. [25] also shows that the TIE’s approach results in a long analysis time,
which makes it less practical for large executables. In addition, TIE can not handle
float type that is a design limitation of BAP.
ElWazeer et al. [25] proposed a more scalable static approach than TIE [41] to
identify structures from binaries. They implemented a modified version of VSA to
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make their pointer analysis faster. However, they claim a good accurcy to detect
pointers, nested pointers and complex data structures, but they did not detail their
type inference work. Their work was more focused to binary rewrite than type infer-
ence, though they claim almost similar accuracy and conservativeness of TIE.
2.2.5 Argument recovery
Existing type inference approaches ([41], [25], [17]) do not discuss much about ar-
guments detection. TIE mentions that it only considers memory assesses above ebp
as arguments. This stack analysis is not adequate to find all the arguments, since
arguments are also passed through registers. ElWazeer et al. [25] propose a heuristic
algorithm on their lifted intermediate language to identify the register arguments.
Caballero et al. [18] propose another approach to identify function arguments from
executables using dynamic analysis. They collect a program execution trace and
identify arguments by recognizing memory access locations. Both works show better
accuracy but suffer from excessive false positives. Our function arguments recovery
algorithm does not assure to identify all the arguments, but shows better precision
than existing works.
2.3 Key ideas and assumptions
In this section, we first give an overview of REWARDS and TIE, as they are closely
related to BinType, and as we borrow several techniques from them and some other




REWARDS. REWARDS follows a purely dynamic analysis approach to infer types.
It instruments a target binary using PIN to collect an execution trace, then infers
types based on the arguments and return types from well-known functions (e.g.,
standard library calls, system calls), and a few type revealing instructions. Whenever
a call to such functions (e.g., strcat) is detected inside a program, REWARDS labels
the memory locations related to the function’s arguments and return accordingly
(e.g., char* ). Newly discovered types are propagated backward and forward to refine
the type of additional variables. This process is based on constraint generation and
resolution that happens during execution, as well as, post-execution. The goal is to
tag memory regions with semantically sound types (e.g., structure that contains IP
addresses) to guide the forensics analysis of memory dumps. We reuse the idea of
type sinks, type revealing instructions and propagation/resolution through constraint
generation. We also work directly on x86, however we do not have access to any
runtime information.
TIE. TIE proposes a combination of static and dynamic analysis approaches. It first
lifts the disassembled binary and execution trace to the BAP Intermediate Language
(BIL) using the Binary Analysis Platform (BAP [16]). BIL registers and memory
regions are assigned uniquely through a simple Single Static Assignment (SSA) algo-
rithm. TIE then applies a modified value-set analysis called Dynamic VSA (DVSA)
to detect variables. The type of these variables is further resolved through constraint
generation based on type sinks and type revealing instructions, similar to REWARDS.
TIE outputs several possible types to remain conservative. Finally, the precision is
calculated by measuring the distance between the actual type and the most precise




Type sinks. A type sink is a point in a program’s instructions, where the type of one
or more variables can be resolved directly. It is usually due to calls to functions that
are well-defined as they follow fixed specifications. System and standard libraries
functions are examples of such functions. Also, a middle size program written in
C/C++ can contain a range from 1,000 to 2,500 standard library functions [30], hence
such calls are a cheap and reliable source of types to start with. For example, the
strcat function contains two char* arguments, along with a char* return type. The
variables involved as calling parameters to strcat can be resolved as char* without
any ambiguity.
Type revealing instructions. An instruction that reveals meaningful information
to resolve a type will be considered as type-revealing. For example, REWARDS
lists the following x86 instructions used in byte-string operations as type-revealing:
movs/b/d/w (moving), stos/b/d/w (storing), lods/b/d/w (loading), cmps/b/d/w
(comparing), and scas/b/d/w (scanning). An instruction starting with f is related to
the floating point operation, e.g., fadd, fld, fbas, and fstp; REWARDS also uses
some of these operations. In addition, we use Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE)
floating-point instructions (e.g., movss, addss and subss), and pointer related oper-
ations, i.e., indirect memory accesses (e.g., mov (%edx),%ebx or mov [mem],%eax),
which reveal pointer type information.
Type propagation. When the type of a variable is refined, it is propagated to other
identified variables to update the constraints on their type. Generally, this method is
used when a variable type is resolved. Its type is then recursively propagated back-
ward (as it influences the resolution of other variables that were previously related),
and forward (all future variables with constraints that depend on that variable).
Constraints generation and solving. A constraint generation derives possible
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constraints based on a variable’s usage. More specifically, each instruction found to
affect that variable will result in a new constraint that depends on the nature of the
instruction. For example, for a signed division or multiplication, TIE adds a constraint
that limits the possible types to signed ones. For each instruction, constraints are
generated (if any), and a solver that contains all previous program contexts tries to
resolve types for any variable used by such instruction.
Value set analysis. Balakrishnan et al. [10] first propose the value set analysis
(VSA) method to identify variables from executables. The goal of VSA is to subdivide
the memory regions into variable-like entities, based on how memory is accessed.
For every memory location and register, it derives an over-estimation of the set of
addresses on which the variables span, and represent them with an upper and lower
bound, and a stride, i.e., s[lb, ub].
Type lattice. TIE introduces a type lattice that connects all supported types.
The upper and lower bound of this lattice corresponds respectively to no type (>),
and inconsistent type (?). It originally assigns the entire lattice as possible types
for a given variable, and later refines this range by upgrading the lower bound and
downgrading the upper bound. Finally, the conservativeness and distance from the
actual type is calculated. If the actual type falls between the inferred upper and
lower bounds, it is considered as a conservative type; and the difference from the
lower bound to actual type in source shows the distance. A lower distance indicates
higher accuracy.
2.3.3 Assumptions
For now, we only consider instructions for the x86 32-bit architecture. However, with
some effort, it is possible to upgrade it for the x86 64-bit architecture, i.e., additional
registers and instructions should be included, some adaptation is needed to support
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the calling conventions and stack formats of x86-64. Unlike TIE, BinType currently
is architecture dependent. (From our experience, the use of IR to achieve platform
independence interferes with accuracy.) We support only C code compiled with gcc
and msvc compilers. We are agnostic to binary optimizations, but we require deobfus-
cated binaries. Deobfuscation is still an open problem, although some proposals are
promising (e.g., [58]). In a binary, we only consider user functions (and ignore other
functions such as compiler-generated ones). Finally, unused variables in source always




This chapter provides a high-level view of BinType, composed of three basic steps:
assembly lifting, function prototype recovery and type inference, along with an ex-
ample. An illustration of the architecture of BinType is provided in Figure 4.
3.1 Overview
Step 1: Assembly lifting. BinType lifts assembly instructions from a binary pro-
gram by leveraging IDA Pro [32], a commercial disassembly toolkit. Apart from as-
sembly lifting, IDA Pro additionally provides: (1) function boundaries, (2) invocation





































Figure 4: An overview of BinType showing different components and their work flows
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Technology (FLIRT [30]), and (3) known memory addresses and offsets (e.g., string
information in _rdata). Furthermore, IDA Pro identifies a set of variable-like entities,
apparently, based on stack analysis. We divide obtained assembly instructions into
a code segment (instructions from _text segment) and a data segment (instructions
from _data, _bss, _rodata). In the code segment, BinType manipulates instances of
registers incremented when their value is modified. For example, BinType instantiates
ecx to ecx1, ecx2, etc., whenever ecx is updated with a new value.
Step 2: Function arguments recovery. We use the code segment obtained from
Step 1 to recover function arguments. Identification of the exact number of arguments
for a function highly depends on the accurate detection of the calling conventions
and register arguments. We leverage Hex-Rays Decompiler [31] (later we refer it as
Hex-Rays), a widely used industrial tool for decompilation, to capture the calling
convention of each function. However, we do not use any information related to
the number of arguments it detects, nor any other type-related information (which
are quite unreliable). Based on the calling convention, BinType analyzes the stack
and registers to enumerate the correct number of arguments. For example, in the
stdcall calling convention, memory accesses with addresses above ebp (e.g., ebp+4 or
ebp+8) represent stack arguments. Respectively, an argument is counted as a register
argument, if it is used without initialization inside the function boundary.
Step 3: Type inference. The variables and arguments recovered in Step 2 are
passed to our type reconstruction algorithm, along with the code and data segments.
BinType first looks for standard library function calls inside the code segment to ex-
tract type information (treating such calls as sink points). A standard library call can
provide unambiguous type information, as the syntax and semantics of these func-
tions are well-defined and publicly known. For instance, registers used as arguments
of strcat are resolved as char*. We also identify instructions that reveal partial or
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precise information of a variable’s type. For example, the unsigned shift left instruc-
tion shl indicates that the destination register has an unsigned type. This instruction
is commonly used to access array indices. We further generate type constraints for
variables depending on the nature of instructions. For example, in the mov src, dest
instruction, we constraint src and dest to have the same type.
Afterwards, BinType unifies types by propagating the inferred types backward and
forward to update the constraints on related variables. Finally, an inter-procedural
analysis is performed to refine types by treating all identified function prototypes as
a sink point.
3.2 Example
To illustrate how BinType works, we use a simple program compiled by gcc from the
source code shown in Listing 3.1. The function foo has two arguments and one local
variable. Listings 3.2 and 3.3 show the code and data segments respectively, from
the instructions disassembled by IDA Pro of function foo (a dotted line indicates
instructions having no effect on type recovery).
1 int foo (char* str , int id)
2 {
3 char buf [20];
4 if (id)
5 {





Listing 3.1: Example C source code
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1 foo proc near
2
3 var_2C = dword ptr -2Ch
4 s = byte ptr -20h
5 arg_0 = dword ptr 8
6 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
7
8 push ebp
9 mov ebp , esp
10 sub esp , 48h
11 mov eax , [ebp+arg_0]
12 mov [ebp+var_2C], eax
13 ...
14 cmp [ebp+arg_4], 0
15 jz short loc_80484C3
16 mov eax_1 , offset format
17 mov edx , [ebp+arg_4]
18 mov [esp+0Ch], edx
19 mov edx_1 , [ebp+var_2C]
20 mov [esp+8], edx_1
21 mov [esp+4], eax_1
22 lea eax_2 , [ebp+s]









Listing 3.2: BinType code segment parsed from IDA Pro assembly instructions
for the gcc-compiled source code given in Listing 3.1
1 _rodata segment dword public ’CONST’ use32
2 assume cs:_rodata
3 format db ’%s from id %d’,0Ah ,0
4 ...
5 _rodata ends
Listing 3.3: BinType data segment corresponding to Listing 3.2
1 signed int __cdecl foo(int a1 , int a2)
2 {





8 sprintf (&s, "%s from id %d\n", a1 , a2);




Listing 3.4: Output of Hex-Rays Decompiler for the compiled source
Function prototype recovery. BinType detects the cdecl calling convention for the
function foo from the output of Hex-Rays at Line 1 in Listing 3.4. Variables arg_0
and arg_4 in Lines 5-6 in Listing 3.2 are resolved as stack arguments according to
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the cdecl convention. The code segment does not contain any uninitialized register,
which indicates there is zero register arguments. Since the register eax_3 is assigned
a value before foo returns, the return type is not void.
Type reconstruction. Lines 3-6 (Listing 3.2) show all variables detected by IDA
Pro. We attempt to identify the type information for these variables from the rest of
the instructions.
Our algorithm detects a call to the sprintf standard library function (a sink
point) with eax_2 and eax_1 as passing arguments at Line 24. Before the function
call, parameters are initialized in Lines 21-24. From sprintf, both registers are
resolved to char* and format string, respectively. Through a backward resolution,
variable s is resolved as char*, and offset format as format string (Line 16).
BinType extracts the formatted string value of the format parameter from the
_rodata section at Line 3 in Listing 3.3, and identifies %s and %d as format string
specifiers. From Lines 17-20, BinType detects that edx and edx_1 are initialized,
and passed as parameters for format. As %s and %d represent values of types char*
and int respectively, edx is resolved as int and edx_1 as char*. Through a backward
propagation of both registers, arg_4 is resolved as int, var_2C as char*, and arg_0
as char*. An integer value is copied in the return register eax_3 at Line 27, implying
that the return type is int.
In the end, BinType resolves all data types, including function arguments, local
variables and return. Table 1 gives a summary of all variables and their inferred
type, and the instructions involved in the resolution. We also show in Table 2 that
for the same example, TIE and REWARDS fail to detect half of variable types. The
obtained results for TIE and REWARDS are based on our analytical understanding
of their algorithms, since these tools are publicly unavailable.
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Table 1: Inferred types from IDA Pro assembly instructions
Variables Inferred type Instruction line(s) Resolve point
var_2C int 17, 20-21 format string (%d)
s char* 25 standard library call
arg_0 int 11-12 unification
arg_4 char* 17-19 format string (%s)
Table 2: Inferred types by prior work (Hex-Rays, REWARDS and TIE) and BinType
for Listing 3.2
Variables Hex-Rays REWARDS TIE BinType
var_2C int 32-bit data reg32 int
s char char* char* char*
arg_0 int 32-bit data reg32 int




In this chapter, we explain the detailed methodology and the type inference algorithm
behind BinType. We discuss our typing system, present mechanisms for function ar-
guments recovery and complex type segregation, detail how type sinks, type revealing
instructions and format strings are used in BinType.
4.1 BinType’s type inference methodology
4.1.1 BinType typing system
Figure 5 shows the type lattice used in BinType, which is designed for the 32-bit
x86 architecture. Table 3 shows how our type lattice is connected to C types in a
32-bit architecture. An unknown variable will be typed as reg32, reg16, and reg8,
respectively for a 4-byte, a 2-byte, and a single byte value; otherwise, it will be typed
as reg(n).
Compared to TIE [41], our lattice additionally includes floating-point types, and
adds an extra edge between complex types (reg(n)) and unknown types (>). A











Figure 5: BinType type lattice
Table 3: Mapping between C types and types in our lattice system













* (pointer), [] (array), structure reg(n)
void ?
Additionally, a variable can also be typed as reg(n) directly from the unknown type
(>), if it contains multiple 4-byte values. We exclude code_t type from our type sys-
tem (considered in the TIE lattice to designate the destination of goto instructions).
4.1.2 Function argument recovery
Identifying the correct function prototype depends on detecting the complete and
accurate set of function arguments and return. If some arguments are not detected
accurately, then the resulting signature of the function misleads the subsequent reverse
engineering analysis. In the x86 architecture, arguments do not only pass through
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the stack but also registers; however, register arguments identification remains less
explored by prior work. ElWazeer et al. [25] propose a brute force algorithm for
determining register arguments and return; if a register inside a function boundary is
used without being initialized, it is counted as a register argument. However, they do
not consider the calling conventions, and assume all registers as uninitialized at the
beginning of their analysis. We show in Section 5 that their method produces many
spurious arguments.
Knowing the calling convention reveals the registers and stack locations used to
pass the function parameters. We follow three commonly used calling convention rules
in C on x86: cdecl, stdcall, fastcall. In the cdecl and stdcall, memory accesses with the
address above ebp (e.g., ebp+4 or ebp+8) represent an argument. On the other hand,
the fastcall convention adds the following constraint: the first three arguments with
primitive types are passed in eax, ecx and edx. For all three conventions, floating
point values are passed as parameters in the stack, and results are passed in the
floating point stack; the register eax is used to return all other primitive data types.
We extract the calling convention for each function from the generated pseudo
C code by Hex-Rays. Based on the convention, we analyze the stack and register
arguments from the IDA Pro assembly. Memory accesses on top of the stack are
always counted as arguments (common rules for passing a parameter). To obtain
the register arguments, we only consider uninitialized registers that are relevant in
related conventions. For unknown calling conventions, we perform an uninitialized
register analysis on all registers for the first basic block. In our experiments, we no-
ticed that most passing register arguments are moved to different memory locations
at the beginning of a function start. We use this heuristic to reduce false positives.
For identifying the return type, we rely on the variable that performs the last write
into eax or the floating point stack.
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1 foo2 proc near
2
3 var_10 = dword ptr -10h
4 var_C = dword ptr -0Ch
5 var_5 = byte ptr -5
6 arg_0 = word ptr 8
7 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
8 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
9 arg_C = qword ptr 14h
10
11 push ebp
12 mov ebp , esp
13 sub esp , 18h
14 push ebx
15 mov [ebp+var_5], dl






22 *Identified function prototype by
23 Hex -Rays: [arguments: 4], [return: yes]
24 BinType : [arguments: 6], [return: yes]
Listing 4.1: Function prototype identified by Hex-Rays and BinType for the given
assembly.
To demonstrate the relevance of this approach, we compare Hex-Rays with our
method to detect function arguments on a simple function foo2; see Listing 4.1. This
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Table 4: Typing rules for constraint generation and solving (n 2 32, 16, 8). The
method SetType is used to update the type of src and dest. By =s, we denote any
signed operation, e.g., signed multiplication/division. j represents a logical OR.
Mnemonic type Constraint Solver
arithmetic op 2{ +, -, *, /, %} src = num_n j int_n j float
dest = num_n j int_n j float
if src = empty then
SetType(num_n,num_n)
else SetTypeDest(src)
bitwise op 2 { ^, &, «, »} src = num_n j int_n
dest = num_n j int_n
if src = empty then
SetType(num_n,num_n)
else SetTypeDest(src)
signed op 2 { =s } dest = int_n j uint_n
if op = =s then
SetTypeDest(int_n)
else SetTypeDest(uint_n)
assignment op 2 { = } dest = src SetTypeDest(src)
unary op 2 { ++, - -, :} dest = int_n j uint_n
if dest 2 array index then
SetTypeVar(uint_n)
else SetTypeVar(int_n)
typecast (dest, src) n = n  2 j n=2
if sizeof(dest) > sizeof(src) then
SetTypeDest(src_n2)
else SetTypeDest(src_n=2)
function takes six arguments, however, Hex-Rays can only identify four arguments
(two register arguments and two stack arguments). We consider the fastcall conven-
tion, which helps to detect two arguments (dl and ecx) as register arguments, and
four arguments (arg_0 to arg_C) from stack analysis.
4.1.3 Complex type segregation
Distinguishing complex variables is one of the most challenging part in reverse engi-
neering. Without proper address tracking, it is difficult to recover complete informa-
tion. We only differentiate complex types (structures, arrays, pointers) from primitive
types, a process we refer to as complex type segregation. For this purpose, we follow
VSA [9]: we track indirect memory accesses in [base + index  scale + disp], where
base and index are registers, and scale (1, 2, 4, or 8) and disp (displacement, e.g., any
32 bit value) are constants. We consider each memory region (the upper and lower
bounds) as a one-bit array with value all zeros. During the analysis, we perform the
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address arithmetic and change a value from zero to one inside a memory boundary,
based on whether it is accessed or not. MEM {11,12,13,...1i,....0n 1,0n} implies that
the first i bytes of an n-byte memory block are accessed by the program. If we detect
a memory access to a variable that is not inside its known boundaries, we update
the variable length by adding the amount of size it accesses. For example, if the
address of a variable with four-byte size is moved into a register eax (e.g., mov eax,
[var]), and the next instruction tries to access a value from [eax + 4] (e.g., add ecx,
[eax+4]), we infer that the variable holds a pointer, and the subsequent instruction
merely accesses the next four bytes. In the end, we obtain the length of all variables
and their memory layouts. A variable with more than a four-byte length is counted
as a complex variable. The identified memory layouts can be used to detect more
specific information about memory regions.
4.1.4 Format string analysis
C provides a set of standard library functions for formatting strings. For example,
scanf and printf are used to read and write formatted data, and error, error_at_line
are applied for formatted error logs. A format specifier (beginning with %) is used
to generate this format string. An argument is passed to replace the respective
specifier with the argument value in the resulting string. The prototype of a format
specifier [54] is defined by %[flags][width][.precision][length]specifier. The types of
arguments inside the format string is identified from the format specifier characters
(e.g., %d implies signed integer).
We create a list of standard library functions taking format strings as an argument.
We identify a pattern (e.g., mov [esp], offset format; call printf ) of represented format
string in a program binary, and then the type information from it. We iterate through
each character of the format string for a % (format specifier) that indicates the starting
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point of formatted data. We then identify the corresponding specifier character, the
argument corresponding to the specifier, and finally, assign a type for the argument
based on the specifier character.
4.1.5 Constraint generation and solving
In our work, constraint generation and solving is mainly concerned with resolving
primitive type variables. Complex types are already identified through our complex
type segregation (see Section 4.1.3), type revealing instructions and sink points. We
apply the rules described in Table 4 for constraint generation and solving.
If a variable involved in a binary operation is identified as a pointer, that operation
is considered as a pointer arithmetic operation, and the destination variable must be
a pointer as well. Similarly, binary arithmetic instructions involve integer or float
point computations. Thus, each operand can be an integer, number or float type.
If the source operand does not have a type then the solver assigns the number type
(num_n) for both the source and destination variables. Otherwise, the destination
variable will be the same type as the source. Similarly, the use of unary operators
(increment and decrement) on an array index allow us to infer that the type of the
operands is (at least) unsigned. Assignment instructions indicate that the source and
destination have similar types.
4.1.6 Type sinks
BinType identifies the invocation of a standard library function call to determine
the type of a variable. BinType uses IDA FLIRT [30] to identify standard library
functions from program instructions. FLIRT extracts a pattern of each standard
library function and stores it in a signature database. A match with this signature
during the assembly analysis will be treated as a library function call. IDA Pro 6.8
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contains 30MB of signatures for x86, which is almost 100 times larger than the type
sinks considered in TIE and REWARDS.
4.1.7 Type-revealing instructions
BinType considers all the type revealing instructions from REWADRS. In addition,
we consider instructions that provide partial information about a type, and take into
account the SIMD Extensions (SSE) floating-point instructions (e.g., addss, subss).
4.1.8 Signed and unsigned types
Most past proposals in type inference [41, 42, 53, 25, 17] do not consider jump in-
structions (e.g., jge, jnl), which appear to be a good source for signed type. Deng et
al. [22] first create a list of jump instructions to perform signed type analysis, which
is used for static integer overflow vulnerability detection in Windows binaries. We
reuse the jump instructions from Deng et al. in our work.
We divide these instructions into two sets: signed and unsigned type instructions.
If a variable or register is used as an argument of a memory allocation function, or an
index of an array, then it must be an unsigned type. Moreover, variables compared
by different x86 conditional jump instructions, e.g., ja, jae, jb, jbe, je, jne are typed
as unsigned, while variables in instructions jge, jnl, jng, jnge are typed as signed.
4.2 Type inference algorithm
Algorithm 1 outlines the steps in BinType’s type inference. Given a binary program,
our algorithm resolves all variable types including the arguments and return. The
inputs are the code and data segments, along with all identified variables.
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1 Notation used (more in the description below):
2 Ii: ith instruction from asm_file;
3 trins: List of type revealing instructions;
4 sinkdb: List of sink points;
5 mi: Instruction mnemonic for ith instruction;
6 C: Constraints for mi;
7  : List of constraint operators;
8 IDAV ar: List of variables from Hex-Rays;
9 V ar: List of all identified variables and their types;
10 V arop: Similar variable list for the operand op;
11 Input: Disassembled binary file asm_file
12 Output: Identified variables and types (V ar)
13 Function resolve_type(asm_file)
14 foreach Ii 2 asm_file do
15 if Ii = mov(src, dest) then
16 update_dependency_list(src, dest);
17 end
18 else if mi 2 trins then
19  = get_type_from_instruction(mi);
20 unify_type(op,  , mi);
21 end
22 else if Ii 2 sinkdb then
23  = get_sink_type_from_signature(mi);
24 unify_type(op,  , sp);
25 end
26 else if mi 2   then
27 C = generate_constraint(mi);
28  = solve_constraint(C,  );
29 unify_type(op,  , cs);
30 end
31 end
32 return V ar;
33 end
34
35 Function update_dependency_list(src, dest)
36 V ardest:append(src);
37 V arsrc:append(dest);
38 if src 2 IDAV ar then
39  = get_type(src);
40 if () then





46 Function unify_type(op,  , type_src)
47 foreach var 2 V arop do
48 if type_src of var > type_src then
49 var   ;
50 end




ALGORITHM 1: BinType’s type inference algorithm
The resolve_type method. This is the main method of our type inference algo-
rithm. For each instruction Ii in an assembly file, the method checks whether Ii is:
(1) an assignment instruction (e.g., mov, lodsx, lea, stosx), (2) a type revealing
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instruction, or (3) a type sink. Additionally, the method checks the possibility of
generating constraints from the instruction mnemonic. The details of these checks
are provided below.
1) Assignment instruction (Line 15). An assignment instruction implies that the
destination (dest) has a similar type dependency as the source (src). This constraint
is added in both variables’ dependency list by triggering the update_dependency_list
method with dest and src as the arguments.
2) Type revealing instruction (Line 18). If the instruction mnemonic is an entity
of type revealing instructions, then the get_type_from_instruction method is called
to extract the type from the instruction mnemonic mi. The calling method holds the
type information for the type revealing instructions, and retursn the corresponding
type of the received argument. The identified type () is then propagated to all
variables that should have the same type by calling the unify_type method.
3) Sink point (Line 22). If a function call in the instruction Ii is a type sink, then
the prototype of that function is obtained from the get_sink_type_info_from_signature
method. This method contains all the standard library functions, along with proto-
types that are identified by IDA FLIRT for the target executables. The calling method
finds the received function name into the list, and returns the matching function pro-
totype. Variables that are used as arguments of the function call, will be typed
according to the function prototype. Finally, unification (the unify_type method) is
applied to propagate the type information to all the function contexts.
4) Constraint generation and solving (Line 26). If an instruction mnemonic (mi)
is found in the constraint generation list in Table 4, then the generate_constraint
method derives possible constraints (C) based on the way a variable is being used,
and calls the solve_constraint method to retrieve the type. The solve_constraint
method applies the solving rules ( ) (at column three, in Table 4), using the current
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execution context, and returns a suitable type () for that constraint variable. A
solver does not guarantee that it will always return a type for every constraint, but if
the type is resolved, then the unification process (unify_type) is applied to propagate
the type information.
After completing the analysis for each instruction, a list of variables and their
types is returned by the resolve_type method.
The update_dependency_list method. This method receives the source (src)
and destination (dest) as arguments from the caller function, and adds them to each
other’s dependency list. A dependency list of a variable contains the variables and
registers that have a similar data structure as that variable. Here, the dependency
list of dest (V ardest) adds src as a relevant type variable, and vice-versa. If src is an
entity of the variable list (i.e., variables identified by IDA Pro), then type information
for that variable is requested through the get_type method. A valid type () is then
passed through both src and dest dependency lists using the unify_type method.
The unify_type method. Whenever a type is resolved, this method is called to
propagate the type information. A back propagation is recursively applied to prop-
agate the identified type to all variables that should have the same type. Following
arguments are received by unify_type: operand name (op), type (), and type source
(type_source). type_source holds the value from where a type is resolved: (i) sink
point (sp), (ii) type revealing instruction (tri), (iii) constraint and solver (cs), and
(iv) unification (uf). We prioritized the source points as follows: sp > tri > cs
> uf . The type identified from a higher priority source is disseminated during the
back propagation. Thus, our approach helps to traverse deeper in the type lattice,
which results more accurate type. For example, a variable var is recognized as num32
through the constraint solver. Later, a sink point returns int32 for that variable. A
sink point always provides the exact type information, therefore we put it in the top
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priority. According to the priority order, our method modifies the var type num32
to int32, which allows the var to go one step down in the lattice. The unify_type
method first extracts each variable (var) from the operand dependency lists (V arop);
then it replaces the old type with the new one, if the priority of the current type
source var is less than the inferred type source; and finally, it calls the update_type
method again using that var as an operand to solve its dependent variable list. This
procedure is continued until all variables from the list is updated.
Example. We illustrate step by step execution of our algorithm with a simple ex-
ample in Table 5. The first column of the table presents assembly instructions, where
Ii denotes ith instruction in an assembly file; the second column provides the variable
V ar with its dependency list as well as their type; third and last columns provide how
type information is inferred from different source points, and how a type is resolved
through backward propagation. Our algorithm finds a match with a mov instruction
mnemonic in I1 and I2, where the src operand is moved to a 32 bit register eax, and
then moved to the stack. For the mov instruction, the algorithm updates the vari-
able src’s dependency list V arsrc, by adding the destination register eax0; also src
is added in V areax0 ; in a similar way, V areax1 and V ardest are updated by dest and
eax1, and typed as reg32. The strcpy invocations in instruction I5 is a type sink that
implies st0 and st4 must be of type char. Every new type identification always ends
up with a backward resolution by calling the unify_type method. The third column
shows how the backward propagation works, and updates the type information of
a variable. The method takes the dependency list of V arst0 and V arst4 , and types
its variables eax1 and eax0 as char; next, it takes the dependency list of eax1 and
eax0 and resolves the type. Thus, all variables of V areax1 and V areax0 is resolved by








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.1 Inter procedural type analysis
As a last step of the algorithm, we run an inter procedural analysis. We get the
type of all function arguments, local variables and the return for each function from
the previous step. We then use this information to refine the typing information one
more time. Variables that are still untyped has a high chance to be typed during this
inter procedural analysis. We create a function list using these identified function
prototypes. We generate a call graph using IDA Pro for the entire program and
perform a depth first search (DFS) from the root node (i.e., main). The edge between
two nodes implies a function call, and nodes are treated as a caller and callee. The
variables of the caller will be typed using the caller as a sink point (similar to a




5.1 Implementation and experiment settings
BinType is implemented on top of IDA Pro. We write 4.5K SLOC C# code for
parsing the assembly instructions, recovering the function prototypes and identifying
Figure 6: User interface of BinType
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type information. The user interface of BinType is showed in Figure 6.
We take 148 binaries (704,658 instructions) from six commonly used C open
source projects: procps-3.2.6 [6] (with 19.1K SLOC), iputils-20020927 [2] (with 10.8K
SLOC), net-tools-1.60 [5] (with 16.8K SLOC), coreutils-5.93 [1] (with 117.5K SLOC),
sqlite [7] (with 119.7K SLOC) and miniz [4] (with 3.7K SLOC). We conduct the fol-
lowing experiment on a machine with a 3.10 GHz Core i7-3770S processor and 8GB
RAM running Windows 7 64-bit operating system.
For comparison, we need the actual variable types from the source code. Instead
of parsing the source (which may be unreliable due to function inlining), we first
compile all source programs in debug mode, and then use libdwarf [3], a C library, to
obtain DWARF information (with variable types) from ELF object files. Libdwarf is
an essential tool used in type inference ([41], [42]) for reading DWARF information
from application binary. We mainly use this tool to extract and organize the stack
variables. Some of these variables may be scattered in the source code, which can
be meticulously arranged with libdwarf. The output of libdwarf variables is used for
automated comparison with the output of BinType. While BinType resolves type
information for whole executables, we evaluate only the outcomes of the user-level
code (e.g., exclude compiler functions). Note that we do not use debug binaries as
input to BinType.
5.2 Experimental results
In this section, we show the accuracy of type inference and function arguments iden-
tification, and scalability of BinType.
Accuracy of BinType. We evaluate the accuracy of BinType by measuring the
differences between the types of variables declared in the program source code and



































Type inference w/ format string
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Figure 9: Conservativeness of identified variable types by BinType and Hex-Rays
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Table 6: Comparison between BinType and TIE’s static analysis (Table 2 in [41])
Conservativness (ideal=1) Distance (ideal=0)
Program TIE BinType TIE BinType
chroot 0:87 0:82 1:76 0:72
df 0:942 1:00 1:42 0:07
groups 0:93 1:00 1:52 0:00
hostid 0:97 1:00 1:63 0:00
users 0:97 1:00 1:51 0:27
Average 0:93 0:96 1:57 0:21
First, we compare our accuracy against Hex-Rays. For both BinType and Hex-
Rays, we assign all identified complex data structures to a single complex type. Our
aim is to see the efficiency of both methods to identify complex variables, not to
extract exact complex type, which is a challenging problem (and most current tools
report results with doubtful accuracy, see e.g., [53, 42]). If the identified complex vari-
able represents any complex type (e.g., array, pointer or structure) inside the source,
we consider it as a match. Finally, we calculate the conservativeness and accuracy
(distance from the exact type) of a variable using TIE’s metrics. Variables with a
smaller distance are more accurately typed (ideal distance is zero). Figures 9 and 8
illustrate the conservativeness and distance of variables type identified by BinType
and Hex-Rays. In both cases, BinType outperforms Hex-Rays. BinType is around
32% more conservative (93% vs. 61%), and offers closer distance (0.87 vs. 1.75) than
Hex-Rays.
Second, we compare our accuracy with TIE [41] using the similar metrics and
binaries (87 binaries from Coreutils) used in their evaluation. In both type lattices,
the maximum distance between levels is four. In our case, the upper bound of each
identified variable is assigned as reg32, reg16, reg8, or reg(n) based on their length.
All inferred types at the end of the analysis are counted as lower bounds. We measure
the distance by calculating the difference between the lower bound and actual type.
We also calculate the conservativeness by comparing the exact type position inside
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the type boundary. Our results show that BinType is 95% conservative, which is
almost similar compared to TIE (the exact value is unavailable, the bar charts of TIE
presentation slide [40]). Since our structural type distance calculation method does
not follow the similar method in TIE, we only compare our results with TIE’s real
type average distance 1.42 (obtained from TIE slides, apparently better than what
is reported in the paper). Our average distance (1.13) is better than TIE, indicating
that BinType is a more precise type inference tool. Table 2 in TIE points to actual
conservativeness and distance values of five binaries. Our comparison with their
samples is given in Table 6. Note that, for TIE’s dynamic analysis, conservativeness
(1.0) and distance (1.15) metrics are better, but the code coverage is under 9%.
Format strings. We select nine widely used modules from our selected dataset,
and compute the effectiveness of format strings for type inference. Figure 7 presents
our accuracy results with and without the use of format strings; as apparent, format
strings improve accuracy by almost 9%.
Arguments recovery. To verify the strength of our proposed technique in Sec-
tion 4.1.2, we estimate the accuracy of identified function arguments. From our anal-
ysis, we find that BinType’s argument recovery algorithm can successfully identify all
stack arguments, but sometimes misses some register arguments (mostly due to the
presence of very few uninitialized registers outside the first basic block). We compare
our work against Hex-Rays, and get slightly better precision (3%) (see Figure 10).
We also measure the results against the function prototype recovery algorithm
proposed by ElWazeer et al. [25] and Caballero et al. [18]. ElWazeer et al. use a static
approach that can detect all stack and register arguments with 0.20 false positive per
function. A dynamic analysis technique is used by Caballero et al., which claims
the similar detection rate with a better false positive rate (0.15 false positive per



































Figure 10: Precision of identifying function arguments
(BinType) vs. 83% ([25]) and 86% ([18]), and false positive rate, which is 0.06% for
BinType.
Scalability. We measure the number of instructions for each project and the time
to infer the type information. Table 7 shows the average time for each module.
We can process about 25,000 instructions/second, compared to DIVINE [10]’s 10.8
instructions/second (averaged from Table 2 in the 2007 DIVINE paper; machine
Table 7: BinType scalability








configuration is unavailable). To the best of our knowledge, most prior work used
DIVINE, either directly or a modified version of DIVINE’s algorithm (i.e., VSA), for
identifying variable types. Note that, compared to prior work, our complex variable




BinType can be applied to a number of applications. In this chapter, we demonstrate
how BinType provides unique benefits to improve the binary to source similarities.
We develop an application called CodeBinPlus by extending an existing proposal
CodeBin [50], which is used to find the binary to source function similarities. The
main challenge in identification of reused functions in a binary program is to find
out common features within a binary and source code. As extended features in
CodeBinPlus, we use the extracted function prototypes and string literals of BinType,



























Figure 11: Overall design of CodeBinPlus (adapted from CodeBin [50])
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Table 8: CodeBinPlus test dataset
Projects Functions Lines of Code
Linux Kernel 236; 08313; 416; 043
Sqlite 1; 859 99; 674
Coreutils 2; 124 59; 673
Miniz 120 5; 260
Curl 64 9; 434
Zmap 360 11; 638
Unqlite 2; 682 84; 347
Tor 4; 241 179; 282
Git 5; 880 157; 858
Putty 2; 275 80; 882
Redis 2; 952 46; 407
Hashkill 2; 674 420; 719
6.1 CodeBinPlus
CodeBinPlus builds on top of CodeBin. Overall, our approach is designed around the
following procedure (see Figure 11).
Source processor. First, CodeBin parses and analyzes the source code of different
C projects, and transforms them into annotated call graphs (ACGs) by extracting
specific features and relationships, such as internal functions calls, number of function
arguments, complexity of control flow, and calls to standard library functions and
system APIs. CodeBinPlus extends this feature list by adding function prototypes
and string literals from source functions. Indexed function prototypes do not contain
the exact type information for arguments. Since BinType may output types that are
not defined in C (e.g., num32), we only use primitive vs. complex information. When
ACGs are created from source code, they are stored in a database accompanied by
specific indices to allow fast searching. All codebases will be stored in a single database
with unique labels, allowing for lookup operations over many different codebases.
Binary processor. For each target binary file, CodeBin disassembles and analyzes
the binary to extract the same features as source, creating binary ACG patterns.
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CodeBin leverages Hex-Rays to lift its required features. We already discussed Hex-
Rays’ limitation to identify the correct number of arguments and function prototypes.
CodeBinPlus uses BinType to collect this information, as well as string literals. ACG
patterns extracted from binary functions are then converted into queries that can be
run against the source graph database.
Score matrix. CodeBinPlus assigns a score to each extracted ACG based on the
presence of distinctive features, such as library and API calls, the number of function
arguments, string literals and the total number of binary functions included in the
pattern. It takes the output of CodeBin, and scores it one more time with the newly
added features.
Finally, we evaluate CodeBinPlus using several open source projects; we present
the results of code reuse and no use detection through binary to source matching by
searching 261,314 functions from 12 different C projects (see in Table 8).
6.2 Evaluation
We use two executable binaries, which reuse all or portions of previously indexed
projects. These binaries are created by compiling (default settings) open source li-
braries. All tests are run on a Windows 7 x64 desktop machine powered by an Intel
Core i7-4790 CPU with a frequency of 3.6 GHz, utilizing 8GB of memory. We run
CodeBin and CodeBinPlus on our indexed database and compare the obtained results
(we received access to CodeBin’s source only, not their reported dataset).
Results collection and verification. We evaluate CodeBinPlus and CodeBin on
miniz and sqlite binaries that reuse parts of previously indexed source code. In the
results, a binary function may be correctly matched to a unique source candidate,
or may be mapped to several source candidates. We have included the percentage
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of cases where the correct source candidate is uniquely identified (top 1), or listed
among the top 3 or 5 functions.
Reuse detection. Our evaluation results on CodeBinPlus and CodeBin show that
approximately 87% of miniz and 85% of sqlite reused functions are uniquely and
correctly matched to their source code, where CodeBin reports 69% and 71%, re-
spectively. CodeBinPlus can identify 95% correct source candidates in top 3. In
contrast, we found, CodeBin detects 84% correct source candidates in top 3. Fig-
ure 12 shows the effectiveness of BinType’s features to refine the candidate list. Our
features improve the accuracy of BinType around 20% to identify the unique result.
No reuse. We run one more test to verify the significance in a no reuse scenario. We
remove miniz source code from our indexed database, and run the same test again
with a binary containing miniz functions. CodeBinPlus and CodeBin still return some
matches in this case. CodeBinPlus recognized 14 functions, which match at least one
candidate from the indexed functions, in contrast to CodeBin’s 43 (ideal case is zero).
56


























































































































































Correct candidate in top 5
CodeBinPlus
CodeBin




Reverse engineering binary programs, more specifically recovering variables and their
types have many application cases such as binary to source matching, identifying
function prototype, binary rewriting, function clone detection. Hence, any automatic
mechanism to recover variables along with their types from binary programs is con-
sidered significantly valuable.
In this work, we presented BinType, a type inference system on x86 assembly
instructions. Unlike the previous works such as [41], [42] which are not scalable and
take long analysis time in large binary, we provided a scalable solution on a large
dataset that was magnitude faster than the previous solutions. We improved related
techniques to infer types from x86 instructions and also introduced format string anal-
ysis to improve our precision. We also improved the accuracy of function arguments
recovery by introducing unique uninitialized registers identification technique. We
showed that our algorithm is more precise than other existing proposals. Moreover,
we applied our extracted features as an application in binary to source matching and
demonstrated a good accuracy to identify reused functions.
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